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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE UNDERMINING 
CORPORATE AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO 
MARKET ITS CREATIVITY: A CALL FOR A 
REASONED SOLUTION BY THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT IN LIGHT OF THE 
CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK SYSTEM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing crisis among international trademark own-
ers over the protection afforded international trademarks in devel-
oping countries.1 American companies face increasingly restrictive 
foreign barriers on trademark use.2 These restrictions limit the eq-
uitable access American companies have to foreign markets,8 and 
threaten to eliminate the trademark's traditional function.• Devel-
oping countries view trademarks as a means of acquiring much 
needed technology through licensing agreements. 1 These countries, 
however, dispute claims by corporations that their trademark legis-
lation, directed against international trademark owners, is abu-
sive.8 Contrarily, they seek a legitimate means to curb the exploita-
tion of local resources and domestic industries. 7 Developing 
countries seek to attach the recognition associated with interna-
tional trademarks to local industry, thereby freeing themselves 
1. Willis, Trademarks in Argentina, Brazil and Andean Pact Countries - A United 
States Perspective, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 183 (1976). 
2. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at 7, col. 1. United States Trade Representative Clayton 
Yuetter stated the growing pirating of trademarks strikes at an area "in which the U.S. has 
a competitive advantage over the rest of the world." Id. 
3. Id. 
4. The trademark's traditional function is to protect the manufacturer's name. Note, 
International Trademark Licensing Agreements: A Key to Future Technical Development, 
16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 178, 181 (1985). Another manufacturer can duplicate a product and 
market it under a different name and not violate trademark law. Id. 
5. Id. at 178. Trademarks are important in the development of Third World countries 
because foreign owned industry will not invest in developing countries unless an adequate 
return on their investment is realized. See id. at 180. Trademarks are a means of insuring 
that a sufficient return is received. Revenue is produced through the payment of royalties by 
the licensee for the use of a trademark. Without foreign involvement, developing countries 
often can not acquire or operate the technology needed to sustain their economic growth. 
Ball, Attitudes of Developing Countries to Trademarks, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 160 (1984). 
6. Ball, supra note 5, at 160. However, some accusations by international trademark 
owners may be justified, but "it should also be kept in mind that in encouraging local indus-
try, and attempting to improve the welfare of their citizens ... [developing countries view 
their] actions [as] ... valid and reasonable." Id. 
7. See id.; see also Note, supra note 4, at 177, 180. 
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from foreign control and ending barriers that prevent market ac-
cess by local manufacturers.8 
In response, legislation has recently been proposed in Congress 
to protect American trademarks abroad more aggressively.9 The 
legislation proposes to link trade and monetary aid with intellec-
tual property rights.10 This linkage is bound to be resisted by de-
veloping countries that are struggling with debt repayments, and 
who already provide as great a protection on trademarks as their 
level of development permits.11 
Apparently, the United States is on the verge of pursuing a 
policy of trademark protectionism.11 This action fails to consider 
the impact this policy will have on the integrity of the trademark 
system in developing countries. Such a policy may exacerbate the 
international trademark crisis. 
This Note asserts that the international trademark problem is 
the result of a series of reactionary and retaliatory actions rooted 
in self-interest.18 Foreign trademark owners abuse the trademark 
system by manipulating their trademark rights and engaging in 
business activities that benefit their economic interests while ex-
ploiting Third World industries and consumers.14 Developing coun-
tries react by enacting legislation that restricts the use of foreign 
trademarks in their countries.11 These enactments attempt to ad-
dress the disparities in the trademark system which foster the 
harmful business activities engaged in by foreign trademark own-
8. Restrictive Business Practices: Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/119/Rev.l, para. 41 (1974) [hereinafter UNCTAD 
Report]. In 1974, 50 percent of all trademarks registered in the Third World were owned by 
foreigners. Willis, supra note 1, at 184. 
9. S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1328, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). In 
1986 similar trade protectionist measures were proposed, which included: S. 2435, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 2663, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1986). The trade bill's objectives are to promote American business interests overseas by 
safeguarding American firms that rely on intellectual property protection. N.Y. Times, Mar. 
11, 1987, at 1, col. 3. 
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1987, at 1, col. 6. The proposals include mandatory retaliation 
in the form of tariffs or quotas against countries that persist in promoting "unfair trade 
practices" directed at American corporations and termination of benefits previously ex-
tended to a developing country. Id. 
11. Id.; see also supra note 2. 
12. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 5, col. 2. The U.S. Government is in the "most pro-
tectionist climate" since the 1930's. Id. 
13. See generally Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
14. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 181, 183. 
15. See id. at 180, 193. 
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ers and to protect the economic interests of developing countries. 16 
However, they limit the trademark's function. 17 Similarly, if the 
U.S. Government enforces a policy of trademark protectionism 
that promotes American business interests abroad, this action may 
contribute to the deterioration of the trademark system because 
developing countries will react adversely to a policy that operates 
at the expense of their social and economic welfare.18 
A more equitable solution may exist to bind the contrasting 
objectives sought by developing countries and international trade-
mark owners than unilateral trade and monetary sanctions. The 
solution will be found in the understanding of the social and politi-
cal differences that exist between industrialized nations and devel-
oping countries, and the acceptance of limited modifications in the 
common practices of international trademark law. Resolution of 
the crisis will require the satisfaction of mutual interests in order 
to achieve market stability, mutual growth and shared prosperity. 
This Note will examine the international trademark protection 
problem and analyze the impact that the American Government's 
recent policy proposals may have on developing countries unable 
to adequately protect American intellectual property rights. In this 
regard, Part II will review the emergence and growth of trademark 
law and its role in creating the current dilemma. Part III will dis-
cuss the major international trademark agreements and their role 
in the international trademark crisis. This leads to an overview in 
Part IV of the recent legislative responses many developing coun-
tries have taken to cure problems with foreign trademark use in 
their countries. Part V examines the United States recent trade-
mark protection proposals. Part VI will analyze the implications 
such a protectionist policy, as embodied in the legislation, may 
have on the present international trademark community, given the 
current international trademark situation. Finally, Part VII will 
recommend alternative solutions aimed at resolving the interna-
tional trademark crisis. This Note will conclude that a policy di-
rected at improving trademark protection for American companies 
abroad, by linking trade with intellectual property rights, is inap-
propriate in light of the continuing deterioration of the trademark 
16. See Ball, supra note 5, at 166-68. 
17. See id. at 160. 
18. Proposed Foreign Trade Legislation, Pro & Con, CONG. DIG. 201 (Aug.-Sept. 1986) 
[hereinafter Proposed Foreign Trade Legislation]. United States Representative Robert H. 
Michel stated: "other nations are just waiting for us to give them an excuse to shut the 
doors on our products." Id. 
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system in Third World countries. This Note posits that future U.S. 
foreign intellectual property policy is misguided and that future 
policy should be based on understanding and compromise, rather 
than self-interest, in order to end a growing crisis in the interna-
tional trademark community and secure American business inter-
ests overseas. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF THEINTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK 
PROTECTION PROBLEM 
The trademark, in its present form, appeared during the in-
dustrial revolution, when its use arose to identify the origin of 
products being mass produced. 19 The modern concept of trade-
mark law thus emerged in developed countries.20 A modern trade-
mark, as defined by the Lanham Act21 is "any word, name, symbol 
or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manu-
facturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them 
from those . manufactured or sold by others."22 The trademark, 
therefore, serves two functions. 28 First, it identifies the trade or 
business associated with the trademarked product,24 and second, it 
functions as a guarantee of consistent quality.H Both of these func-
tions benefit the consumer and manufacturer by protecting their 
19. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 
232, 238 (1983). Trademarks were commonly found inscribed on ancient greek pottery and 
other artifacts, presumably as a symbol that established ownership. Id. at 222. 
20. Id. at 239; Note, supra note 4, at 181. 
21. Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970). 
22. Id. Generally, "the exclusive right to a particular trademark vests with the first 
party to use it to identify goods or merchandise of a particular business. Sole use of a 
[trade]mark may be secured by registration under the Lanham Act." Dobb, Compulsory 
Trademark Licensing as a Remedy for Monopolization, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 505, 507 
(1978). 
23. Diamond, supra note 19, at 246-47. 
24. Id. The trademark originated as an identification symbol. It no longer signifies 
ownership of a product. Today, the trademark identifies a product with a manufacturer. 
O'Brien, The International Trademark System and the Developing Countries, 19 IDEA 89, 
92 (1978). 
25. Diamond, supra note 19, at 246. As an identification symbol the trademark also 
serves the consumer by enabling him to distinguish similar products sold by different manu-
facturers. See Note, supra note 4, at 184. A product's quality, to some degree, is influenced 
by the consumer who will only continue to purchase a product they find satisfactory. Id. 
Furthermore, when foreign trademark owners license their trademarks to industries, the 
contract usually requires that quality control measures be implemented. Howarth, Are 
Trademarks Necessary?, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 228, 234 (1970). As a result, the trademark has 
been touted as a symbol of quality, however, it only serves as an indicator of consistency in 
quality. Diamond, supra note 19, at 246. It does not insure quality. Id. 
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interests.26 For example, by identifying the product with the man-
ufacturer, trademarks help avert fraudulent marketing of goods by 
preventing similar but inferior products from being marketed 
under the same trademark.27 
The trademark's usefulness, however, has not been limited to 
the role of protector and has taken on new importance as a mar-
keting device. 28 Herein lies the source of one of the controversies 
surrounding the conflict over the trademark's usefulness in devel-
oping countries. 29 This alternative role primarily benefits the 
trademark owner,80 who uses the trademark as a tool to promote 
the product's "goodwill."81 Goodwill has been defined as "the at-
tachment of buyers to, and their propensity to purchase, the prod-
ucts of a particular firm. "82 But the trademark does not function 
merely as a symbol of goodwill, it often serves as "the most effec-
tive agent for the creation of goodwill."88 As consumers recognize 
and associate a level of quality with a product, and are satisfied 
with that product, they tend to purchase it exclusively.84 Satisfied 
consumers will also buy different products bearing the same trade-
mark of a particular manufacturer.H This phenomenon is called 
the "spillover effect."86 Consequently, the goodwill associated with 
a trademark is transferable. 87 The outgrowth of the trademark's 
function as a marketing device, apart from licensing fees, is that it 
becomes a tool by which to generate revenue for its owner by at-
26. Shanahan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72 TRADE-
MARK REP. 233, 234 (1982). The trademark protects the manufacturer by identifying a prod-
uct with his manufacturing process. Id. The trademark also allows the public to be pro-
tected inexpensively by enabling the consumer to identify and hold a manufacturer 
accountable for any harm his product causes. Id. at 236. However, some countries may disal-
low such action. Id. 
27. Id. at 238-39. "Trademark owners generally do an excellent job in preventing de-
ception. They have the incentive [and resource] to sue infringers" thereby protecting the 
interests of consumer and manufacturer alike. Id. at 236. 
28. Id. at 241. 
29. See infra notes 49-54. 
30. T . McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 57, 95 (1973). 
31. See Shanahan, supra note 26, at 241. 
32. Note, supra note 4, at 182 (citing H. EDWARDS, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN THE 
BRITISH SOAP INDUSTRY 26 (1962)); see also T. McCARTHY, supra note 30, at 61. Goodwill is 
the "favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public of goods known to emanate 
from a particular source." Id. 
33. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 819 
(1927). 
34. T. McCARTHY, supra note 30, at 60-62. 
35. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 95. 
36. Id. 
37. See T . McCARTHY, supra note 30, at 57-58. 
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tracting consumers to the manufacturer's varied product line.38 
This secondary function as a marketing device at first seems 
an acceptable tool in a competitive market place.39 However, in de-
veloping countries, this function has been used unfairly;'0 With the 
development of mass communication and public access to mass 
media, the trademark's alternative role has acquired new impor-
tance because its purpose, the creation of goodwill, has become the 
trademark owner's primary source of wealth. 41 
There are four significant factors, inter alia, that aid in the 
creation of goodwill,"2 including: 1) the consumer's behavior pat-
tern and brand selection, 2) the trademark's recognition, 3) the as-
sociation of the trademark with quality, and 4) advertising 
strength.43 All four factors can be manipulated by the trademark 
owner to his economic advantage.44 However, advertising is the key 
factor. 45 It is the linchpin which binds all four factors in the crea-
tion of goodwill.46 Advertising a trademarked product over a mass 
medium, for instance, will dramatically increase the trademark's 
recognition. 47 Advertising, therefore, is the most efficient means by 
which to increase the goodwill consumers associate with a manu-
facturer's product.48 
In developing countries, the use of advertising is especially 
profitable because the local population tends to be less educated 
and more susceptible to the influence of advertisements. 49 Often 
38. Note, supra note 4, at 183. A trademark owner's income is characteristically pro-
duced by the remittance of royalty fees paid by the licensee for the use of the trademark. Id. 
The domestic producer's payment is often burdensome. Id. However, the generation of in-
come is ultimately tied to the trademarks goodwill which always belongs to the foreign 
trademark owner. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 93 (citing Helleiner, The Role of Multinational 
Corporations in the Less Developed Countries' Trade Technology, 3 WORLD DEV. 161, 164 
(1975)). 
39. See E: KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 409 
(1976). 
40. See Ball, supra note 5, at 162. 
41. See T. McCARTHY, supra note 30, at 57, 95. 
42. Note, supra note 4, at 182-83. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. "The activities of multinational corporations have significant effects on develop-
ing countries of an economic, social, and political character." See UNCTAD Report, supra 
note 8, para. 30. 
45. Note, supra note 4, at 182-83. 
46. Id. 
47. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 39, at 409. 
48. See Note, supra note 4, at 183 n.47 (citing The Role of the Trademark in Develop-
ing Countries: Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1 
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/A.C.3/3/Rev.1 (1979)). 
49. Ball, supra note 5, at 162. Consumers in developing countries are more susceptible 
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the trademark owner will use the media to stimulate public inter-
est in his product. 50 By using persuasive advertising, the con-
sumer's preference for foreign trademarked goods can be increased 
and retained. u Advertising thus becomes an effective way to shift 
consumer preference from a local brand to a foreign ,one, generat-
ing more revenue for the international trademark owner.H Fur-
thermore, the capital expended and the advertising skill employed 
by the international trademark owner commonly surpasses that of 
the domestic producer.GS This advantage enables foreign trade-
marked goods to usurp consumer demand for local products, 
thereby preventing the domestic industry from competing 
effectively. 54 
The temptation of foreign trademark owners to manipulate a 
trademark right through the use of persuasive advertising is to 
some degree a cause of the present international trademark crisis.55 
to the appeal of persuasive advertising. Id. 
50. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 39, at 409. 
51. Ball, supra note 5, at 162. "Persuasive advertising ... diminishes, warps or over-
whelms buyer knowledge with exhortation. This type of advertising ... is particularly unde-
sirable in developing countries [where] purchasers are unsophisticated in their perceptions 
of advertising appeals [and become] programmed to demand items such as cosmetics, soda 
pop, instant coffee and electric razors in preference to· basic necessities." Id. Foreign trade-
marks are commonly seen in the marketplace by the residents of developing countries such 
as Mexico. See Vargas, Major Innovations Regarding Trade & Service Marks in the Newly 
Revised Law on Inventions & Marks - A Mexican Perspective, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 188-89 
(1976). "Mexico has three million jobless and four million unemployed" and this population 
includes the uneducated and malnourished. Id. at 180. A developing country that has ad-
vanced economically may suffer due to trademark manipulation by foreign trademark own-
ers. Ball, supra note 5, at 161. However, advertising itself is not the problem since local 
industry can just as easily use it in a manipulative fashion. See id. But, the marketing func-
tion does assist the trademark owner in developing and maintaining his market. Shanahan, 
supra note 26, at 241. 
52. Note, supra note 4, at 183. Consumers preference can be slanted through effective 
advertising by foreign trademark owners. Often, domestic and foreign manufacturers enter 
contractual relations that require a certain amount of capital expenditure on advertising. 
Because a trademark renders a product more recognizable, especially in developing coun-
tries where literacy levels are low, foreign firms may attempt to saturate the market with 
their products bearing their trademark thereby increasing profits. See id. 
53. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 93. The power of the "brand-name/advertising/habit 
nexus" is real and is created by the trademark owner, the party that really profits from 
licensing agreements. Id. at 94. 
54. Ball, supra note 5, at 161. "Local authorities often fear that the increased utiliza-
tion of foreign trademarks will become an insurmountable obstacle to achieving any degree 
of economic self-sufficiency." Id. Many foreign firms that operate in developing countries 
are "multi-product concerns." O'Brien, supra note 24, at 95. These companies use the spil-
lover effect to capture greater amounts of the market. See id. Because of this phenomenon 
expansion costs for foreign firms are reduced and their market position strengthened. Id. 
55. Shanahan, supra note 26, at 241, 248. 
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By marketing a foreign good and advertising it in a developing 
country, the local population becomes culturally and commercially 
attached to products bearing a foreign trademark.56 The foreign 
trademark becomes a hindrance to local development because con-
sumers will tend to buy only products bearing the foreign trade-
mark. 57 Lacking consumer recognition of its products and being 
unable to compete effectively, domestic manufactures may van-
ish. 58 Thus, local industry never gets a chance to evolve in develop-
ing countries.59 Ultimately, the local consumer suffers because the 
selection of products available to the public is reduced.60 
Developing countries resent the reliance local consumers have 
on foreign trademarked goods and view such reliance as an obsta-
cle to their economic and industrial development. 61 As a result, de-
veloping countries have come to perceive the trademark system as 
flawed, and of limited value. 62 
Manipulation of a trademark right through the use of persua-
sive advertising, however, does not represent the sole cause of the 
trademark system's deterioration in developing countries.63 When 
a foreign manufacturer decides to conduct business in a developing 
country, he usually enters into a licensing agreement with a domes-
56. UNCTAD Report, supra note 8, para. 41. Extensive advertising induces misguided 
brand loyalty and allows a trademark owner to achieve an entrenched position in the mar-
ketplace. Consumers prefer brand name goods to competing products of comparable quality 
at lower prices. Shanahan, supra note 26, at 248. 
57. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. Consumers of a developing country 
are biased toward foreign images. The use of goodwill apparently becomes abused and the 
trademark supports technology illsuited to the local resources, or creates a demand for 
goods only the rich can afford, or replaces satisfactory local products. Note, supra note 4, at 
180. 
Another problem exists in the creation of a trademark right. Basically, trademark rights 
either accrue through use of the trademark or by whoever registers the trademark first. 
O'Brien, supra note 24, at 101. The right once established can be maintained indefinitely. 
See id. at 100. Once a right is created little action may be needed to keep the trademark 
alive, and therefore a trademark becomes captive by its owner though not used. Id. 
A third hindrance to economic development in Third World countries exists when for-
eign trademark owners use their trademark's recognition in connection with inferior goods 
to be marketed exclusively in developing countries. See The Trademark and its Function in 
the Control of Commercialization, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 83 (1975). This deceptive practice is 
profitable in developing countries where low quality products abound. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. In Mexico, Coca-Cola captured the majority of the local soft drink market 
through the use of superior business resources. The Mexican industry and consumer is now 
dependant on a foreign trademark. Note, supra note 4, at 179. 
61. See Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
62. Id. 
63. Note, supra note 4, at 179. 
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tic producer.64 Through the agreement, the foreign manufacturer 
provides the technology, skill and capital to a domestic producer 
who uses these resources to begin the manufacturing process. H In 
return for the acquisition of technology, the domestic producer is 
subject to certain requirements contained in the licensing agree-
ment. 66 The agreement usually requires that the domestic producer 
use the foreign manufacturer's trademark.67 The domestic com-
pany must license out the use of the foreign manufacturer's trade-
mark at a certain fee.68 This requirement enables the foreign man-
ufacturer to receive an adequate return on his investment. 69 
Restrictions in the trademark licensing agreement are a signif-
icant cause for the decline of the trademark system.70 The agree-
ment may limit the options available to the local licensee. 71 For 
instance, the contract may prevent the domestic manufacturer 
from producing his own product with the use of the foreign trade-
mark, thereby limiting the long term financial reward associated 
with the trademark.72 Moreover, in certain situations the local pro-
ducer may create a profitable market, having taken the initial risk, 
and the foreign trademark owner will not renew the licensing 
agreement. 73 Indeed, the foreign trademark owner may attempt to 
take over the local industry or capture the goodwill connected with 
the trademark built up through the efforts of the domestic com-
pany. 74 Even if the local company later attempts to compete utiliz-
ing the technology originally made available by the foreign manu-
64. Id. at 189. 
65. Id. at 189-90. "The licensor supplies technology and opens a plant in the develop-
ing state so that the domestic licensee can manufacturer the product in either the same or 
similar way." Id. A licensing agreement insures that the quality of the product manufac-
tured will be similar to the quality of the licensors' products. Id. 
66. Id. at 195. 
67. Id. at 178-79. 
68. Id. The trademark licensing agreement authorizes the use of the trademark owner's 
trademark by a licensee. Id. 
69. Id. at 195. 
70. Ball, supra note 5, at 163. 
71. Id. The local manufacturer will likely have to make other concessions including 
royalty payments, territorial restrictions and price maintenance in payments, territorial re-
strictions and price maintenance in consideration for the use of an established trademark. 
Howarth, supra note 25, at 234. Export limitations may also be imposed on the licensee. 
These limitations create "intense resentment" among developing nations because they hope 
to participate in international commerce. Id. 
72. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 93. 
73. Ball, supra note 5, at 163. 
74. Id. "The more successful the domestic entrepreneur, the more vulnerable he be-
comes." O'Brien, supra note 24, at 93. 
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facturer, the local enterprise may fail, having previously 
established a sizable market and generated "goodwill" that now 
benefits the foreign trademark owner.76 This is especially true in 
developing countries where literacy is low and the population relies 
on symbols to differentiate and choose between products they pre-
fer. 76 While the local licensee acquires technology and the use of a 
recognized trademark, the long term economic benefits may remain 
with the foreign owner who receives the product recognition from 
his trademark and eventually retains market control.77 
Developing countries find the exploitation of their consumers 
and manufacturers disdainful and, as detailed later in this Note, 
have responded by attempting to abrogate or modify the trade-
mark system.78 However, it is apparent that it is not the creation of 
a trademark right alone that has generated the present conflict 
over the value and usefulness of the trademark.79 Rather, the era 
that spawned trademark law produced a system ill adapted to the 
present social and economic situations found in developing 
countries. 80 
Misuse of a trademark right manipulated in order to reap ex-
cessive profits, 81 or to maintain consumer preference for products 
bearing a foreign trademark,82 exemplifies defects in the mechanics 
of the trademark system. Despite these injustices, the trademark, 
when used in a reasonable and fair manner, functions admirably as 
a method of protecting both the consumer and manufacturer.88 
75. Ball, supra note 5, at 165. 
76. Id. at 161. 
77. The Trademark & its Function in the Control of Commercialization, 65 TRADE-
MARK REP. 83-84 (1975). "The power of multinational corporations in [developing countries 
is] often considerable and abuses .of such power [have] occurred." UNCTAD Report, supra 
note 8, para. 30. 
78. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
79. See Shanahan, supra note 26, at 248. Some authorities proffer that the manipula-
tion by persuasive advertising and inequitable conditions in licensing agreements have al-
most nothing to do with the trademark itself. Id. Restrictions in trademark licensing agree-
ments are extraneous to the essence of the trademark right, and advertising abuses relate 
more to the regulation of advertising standards and to questions of consumer protection 
than to trademark law. Id. at 247. 
80. The system, after all, was fashioned by developed countries to suit their objectives, 
not those of developing countries. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 104. At the system's origina-
tion, developed countries had homogeneous economic interests, and therefore it was "logical 
to invent an international code of conduct," especially in the area of trademark regulation, 
because their use was often international in scope. Ball, supra note 5, at 170. 
81. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
83. See Shanahan, supra note 26, at 247-48; see also infra note 143. 
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How then are developing countries to safeguard their own interests 
and benefit from the use of foreign trademarks? 
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CON-
CERNING TRADEMARKS 
Developing countries have responded by relying on an assort-
ment of devices to address the problems that exist between them-
selves and foreign trademark owners.84 Increasingly, developing 
countries have turned to international trademark agreements as a 
means by which to redress grievances in the international trade-
mark community.H However, they have not been the panacea that 
developing countries had hoped would remedy the problems asso-
ciated with foreign trademark use in their countries.86 
A. THE PARIS CONVENTION 
In 1882, the Paris Convention (Convention) was formulated 
for the protection of industrial property.87 Today, it remains the 
dominant international agreement on trademark protection.88 The 
agreement provides trademark protection through a system of in-
ternational registration. 89 The purpose of the Convention is to es-
tablish national treatment for both foreign and domestically owned 
trademarks within a member State.90 This sentiment is embodied 
84. See Ball, supra note 5, at 164. 
85. See id. at 169. For instance, in December of 1975, representatives of member states 
to the Paris Convention drafted a declaration containing the objectives for the revision of 
the Convention. This declaration accepted the principle of preferential treatment for devel-
oping countries and permits maximum liberty to every member country to adopt the legisla-
tion and administrative measures they believe are required to meet their political, social and 
economic development. Vargas, supra note 51, at 203. 
86. Lanahan, Trademarks in Mexico - A United States Perspective, 66 TRADEMARK 
REP. 205, 217 (1976). The failure of the Paris Convention is exemplified by the declaration 
of 1975 being only a referendum and not a revision. As a result, the notion of preferential 
treatment was not incorporated into the Paris Convention. See id.; see also supra note 85. 
Both the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom stated "they could not 
bind their governments" to the declaration's objectives. Id. 
87. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (re-
vised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900; at Washington on June 2, 1911; at the Hague on Nov. 6, 
1925; at London on June 2, 1934; at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958; and at Stockholm on July 14, 
1967), reprinted in 3 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADE-
MARKS [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
88. Note, supra note 4, at 185-86. 
89. Id. The Paris Convention does not create an international trademark. Instead, it 
provides protection to the trademark owner upon registration of the trademark in the mem-
ber State. Id. 
90. See Paris Convention, supra note 87, art. 2. Pursuant to the Paris Convention 
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in Article two of the Convention, which states, "[n]ationals of any 
country of the Union shall enjoy in all other countries of the Union 
the advantages that their respective laws grant to nationals. "91 As 
a result, trademarks should enjoy equal treatment in member 
States. 92 However, developing countries are not on an equal footing 
economically or socially with industrialized nations.98 This truth is 
essentially the source of the Convention's unsuitability as a prelim-
inary instrument to protect developing countries against trade-
mark abuse. 94 The Convention's uniform applicability among 
member States does not satisfactorily compensate developing 
countries for their inferior socio-economic status.H Since its incep-
tion, the Paris Convention has failed to give preferential treatment 
to developing countries to mitigate this discrepancy.96 
Yet, the agreement is not structured without some benefit to 
developing countries. The agreement is advantageous to these 
countries in establishing an international trademark system that 
provides flexibility in its implementation, and an opportunity for 
participation in international commerce through a program of re-
gistration among nations throughout the world. 97 In most cases, for 
example, the member State is free to define the amount of protec-
tion to be given trademarks within its country, and the number of 
trademark applications a member State may submit is not lim-
ited.98 These advantages may account for the growing interest de-
every member nation must provide national treatment to all trademarks used or registered 
within their country. National treatment requires that foreign and domestically owned 
trademarks be given equal protection under that State's indigenous law. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Merchant, The Paris Union - Decline & Fall?, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 206 (1978). Any 
national of a member country can not be refused the advantages enjoyed by nationals in any 
of the other member countries. Id. 
93. Note, supra note 4, at 185-86. Developed nations should recognize that developing 
countries have cultures and governments structured radically different from that of the in-
dustrialized western world. With these differences in mind, industries from developed na-
tions should negotiate licensing agreements fairly to account for these discrepancies. See 
Ball, supra note 5, at 173. 
94. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 107. 
95. See id. However, in 1975, a referendum was issued that declared the Convention 
should be modified to provide preferential treatment. This action has not been ratified by 
the voting members. Lanahan, supra note 86, at 217. Developing countries have imple-
mented legislation that restricts foreign trademark use in their countries in order to acquire 
preferential treatment not provided under the Convention. See infra notes 144-47. 
96. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 109. 
97. See Ball, supra note 5, at 170. 
98. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 105 (citing G. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION 
OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 15 (1968)). 
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veloping countries have in the Convention. 99 
The apparent value of these advantages is reduced, however, 
by a suspicion that the agreement conceals obligations that devel-
oping countries find oppressive.100 The agreement's most trouble-
some construction, in this regard, is its regulation of domestic 
trademark law through a series of articles.101 While delegating law-
making authority to member States, the agreement limits a na-
tion's ability to undertake actions that would better serve its inter-
ests.102 Article 19, for instance, states that "countries of the Union 
99. Vargas, supra note 51, at 203. 
100. Ball, supra note 5, at 170. While developing countries favor an opportunity for 
overseas registration and protection that the Paris Convention offers, they fear that compa-
nies from industrialized nations may submit an excessive number of trademark applications 
significantly decreasing the supply of trademarks available for local use. Id. This fear is 
justified in developing countries that have a small industrial base that is growing and that 
will emerge as the nation progresses economically. Id. Foreign producers may capture a 
large number of the usable trademarks before these local industries evolve. O'Brien, supra 
note 24, at 107. In addition, by adhering to the Paris Convention, Third World countries 
may be awash in foreign trademark applications that dramatically increase administrative 
processing costs. Id. These costs are not easily born by Third World countries. Id. 
101. The relevant articles of the Paris Convention concerning trademarks include: 
Art. 2. Equality of Treatment. Nationals of any country of the Union shall enjoy in 
all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws grant 
to nationals. 
Art. 4. Right of Priority. Any person or legal entity who has duly filed an applica-
tion for a trademark in one of the countries of the Union enjoys a right of priority 
of six months for claiming similar rights in the other countries. 
Art. 5. Use of Trademark. If, in any country of the Union, use of registered mark is 
compulsory, the registration may be cancelled only after a reasonable period, and 
then only if the person concerned does not justify his inaction. 
Art. 6. Independence of Trademarks. A mark duly registered in a country of the 
Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries 
of the Union. 
Art. 7. Nature of Trademark Goods. The nature of the goods to which a trademark 
is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to the registration of the mark. 
Art. 10. Unfair Competition. Countries of the Union are bound to assure to their 
nationals effective protection against unfair competition contrary to honest prac-
tices in industrial or commercial matters. 
Art. 12. Special National Industrial Property Services. Each country of the Union 
undertakes to establish a special industrial property service. 
Art. 19. Special Agreements. Countries of the Union reserve the right to make sepa-
rately between themselves special agreements for the protection of industrial prop-
erty, insofar as these agreements do not contravene the provisions of the Paris 
Convention. 
Paris Convention, supra note 87; see also O'Brien, supra note 24, at 106 (citing the Paris 
Convention). 
102. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 107-08. The Convention has been criticized for its 
vagueness and lack of guidance in how to implement its provisions. Id. For example, no 
precise definition of "use" in article five exists. Developing countries may be unable to iden-
tify a trademark that is not in use within the parameters of the Convention. Id. 
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reserve the right to make separately between themselves special 
agreements for the protection of industrial property, in so far as 
these agreements do not contravene the provisions of the Conven-
tion. "103 This article prevents developing countries from supple-
menting the inadequate protection provided under the Conven-
tion.10• It prohibits a developing country from enacting a law which 
grants preferential treatment to domestic trademark owners in or-
der to promote equality between foreign and domestic trade-
marks.106 Such a law is discriminatory, and is contrary to the Con-
vention's stated goal of national treatment.106 
Article four states that "[a]ny person who has duly filed an 
application for a trademark, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in 
other countries, a right of priority."107 Like article 19, this article 
interferes with the internal affairs of a developing country's gov-
ernment. 108 Many developing countries restrict their trade connec-
tions with other states for political reasons. 109 By automatically 
granting certain states a right of priority, the Convention violates a 
developing country's internal politics.110 The Convention's articles 
may bind developing countries to obligations that are not favorable 
to their economic and political interests. m 
The process by which the Convention operates may also un-
fairly prejudice developing countries.112 An amendment or revision 
to the Convention can only be incorporated by a unanimous vote 
of the member States.113 As a result, the possibility for change or 
Linking requirements enacted by several developing states, that are applicable only to 
foreign licensors, conflict with the concept of national treatment. Lanahan, supra note 86, at 
217-18. Developing countries continue to encourage local companies over foreign ones, and 
are not deterred by obligations under the Paris Convention. Id. 
103. See Paris Convention, supra note 87, art. 19. 
104. Ball, supra note 5, at 169. Some actions by developing states united by accords 
separate from the Convention to combat perceived injustices in present trademark systems 
violate Article 19 of the Paris Convention. Id. The Andean Pact is in most part prohibited 
by the Convention. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text. 
105. See Ball, supra note 5, at 171 n.53. 
106. Id. 
107. See Paris Convention, supra note 87, art. 4. 
108. Merchant, supra note 92, at 207, 210. 
109. Id. at 207. For example, it is known that the Arab States boycott Israel. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. Developing countries, however, apparently do not change their internal poli-
cies to comply with the Convention. By ignoring Convention mandates developing countries 
may facilitate the gradual decline of the Convention. Id. Many African countries refuse to 
entertain applications from natural or legal persons from South Africa, for the registration 
of their trademarks. This action violates Article two of the Convention. Id. 
112. Ball, supra note 5, at 171. 
113. Id. 
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modification favorable to developing countries is remote. 114 
At present, the objectives of the agreement, its construction, 
and its mode of operation do not adequately serve the needs of 
Third World countries. m National treatment of trademarks in 
member States is an objective of little value to developing coun-
tries, 116 and the Convention's articles may actually contribute to 
the international trademark crisis by committing developing coun-
tries to obligations not in their interests.117 The advantages offered 
by the Convention may not outweigh the potential disadvantages a 
developing country may face if it is locked within the limitations of 
the Convention.118 
B. THE MADRID UNION 
The Madrid Union, formed in 1891, is a complement to the 
Paris Convention.119 Like the Paris Convention, its purpose is to 
promote equality among member States.120 Unlike the Paris Con-
vention, it allows for the international registration of an approved 
trademark through a single filing with the International Bureau.121 
The agreement eliminates the need for a trademark owner to sub-
mit an application to every member State in order to receive pro-
tection under the prevailing law of the member State.122 The 
agreement designates a renewal period of 20 years.128 The effect of 
these requirements is the creation of an international trademark.124 
As a result, the Madrid Union has been received with indiffer-
ence among developing countries, and few are signatories. m Indus-
114. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 102-09. 
115. Id. 
116. See supra notes 93-96. 
117. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 110. 
118. Id. 
119. Arrangement Respecting the International Registration of Trademarks, Apr. 14, 
1891 (revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900; at Washington on June 2, 1911; at the Hague on 
Nov. 6, 1925; at London on June 2, 1934; and at Nice on June 15, 1957), reprinted in 3 
DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS [hereinafter Madrid 
Union] . 
120. Id. "An application having obtained a national trademark in his country of origin 
may, in all the other countries that are parties to the Union, simultaneously secure protec-
tion for his trademark." Id. 
121. Id. The International Bureau is an agency that administers the daily operation of 
the Union. It processes applications for international trademark status. See id. 
122. Id. "An international trademark automatically creates a pack of identical trade-
marks in all the different countries of the Union." Id. 
123. Id. arts. 6, 7. Renewal is granted upon the payment of a fixed fee. Id. 
124. Note, supra note 4, at 187. 
125. Id. 
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trialized nations have welcomed the agreement because it strength-
ens an international trademark owner's proprietary right by 
augmenting the number ot states in which his right can be en-
forced.126 For developing countries with few "multiple registra-
tions, the gains under scheme are very small compared to the 
costs."127 The Madrid Union has not been embraced by the inter-
national trademark community, and as of 1984, only 25 nations 
had joined the agreement.128 
IV. REACTION BY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO AN 
IMPERFECT TRADEMARK SYSTEM 
In response to invidious licensing agreements that exploit do-
mestic production and international trademark agreements that 
are inadequately designed to protect developing nations, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) 
proposed several measures to resolve the international trademark 
crisis.129 These measures include: (1) the abolition of trademark 
protection in certain sectors; (2) the compulsory licensing of trade-
marks;130 (3) the regulation of certain trademark related mat-
ters(banning, reducing or taxing persuasive advertising);131 (4) 
quality identification through trademark legislation; and (5) qual-
ity · identification independent of the trademark system.132 The lat-
ter two proposals function as an alternative to the present trade-
126. Allen, A Report on the Madrid Agreement, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 290, 292 (1966). 
The Madrid Union members consist of predominantly European countries, most notably 
France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Id. at 302. The United States does not currently partici-
pate in the agreement, while the Soviet Union has joined. See Madrid Union, supra note 
119. 
127. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 110. 
128. See Madrid Union, supra note 119; see also Note, supra note 4, at 187. In 1973, 
the Trademark Registration Treaty was formulated. This third international agreement was 
undertaken to provide for the registration of an international trademark. The treaty has not 
been enacted because a prerequisite number of states did not accede to it. The treaty would 
not serve the interests of developing countries. Id. at 188. 
129. Ball, supra note 5, at 164 n.22 (citing The Role of the Trademark in Developing 
Countries: Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. 
Doc. TD/B/C.6/A.C.3/3/Rev.l, paras. 258-80 (1979)). 
130. Id. at 458. Compulsory licensing forces the owner of a trademark right to grant to 
any competitor a license to use its name and label. See Palladino, Compulsory Licensing of 
a Trademark, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 457 (1977). Foreign trademark owners in Mexico strongly 
disfavor compulsory licensing. See Lanahan, supra note 86, at 219. 
131. See Ball, supra note 5, at 164 n . . 22. "For cultural; or even medical reasons, the 
marketing of certain kinds of products may be undesirable. But it is the products, not their 
trademarks, that are the problem." Shanahan, supra note 26, at 249. 
132. Ball, supra note 5, at 164 n.22. 
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mark system.188 
For several reasons neither of these two proposals may be 
practical. 134 First, they are likely to find disfavor among developing 
countries that can not afford the dramatic increases in administra-
tive costs associated with an alternative method of intellectual 
property protection.136 Second, developing countries lack the ad-
ministrative capability to successfully implement a complex qual-
ity identification program. 186 Third, abrogating the present trade-
mark system may be unwise because it provides protection to both 
the consumer and manufacturer that is inexpensive and effec-
tive.187 Without offering any viable alternative to trademark pro-
tection, the first three UNCTAD proposals may cause foreign busi-
nesses to abandon operations in Third World countries, 188 or seek 
some other retaliatory measure. 189 These measures may escalate 
the seriousness of the conflict that exists between developing coun-
tries and international trademark owners, instead of resolving it.140 
"The draconian nature of these proposals and the likely upheaval 
in world markets" caused by their implementation suggests that 
they will not be observed.141 Developing states must realize that 
replacing the trademark system is not in the best interests of the 
international trademark community,142 rather it is a system that 
133. Note, supra note 4, at 192-94. 
134. Id. 
135. Ball, supra note 5, at 170. 
136. See id. The introduction of alternative protection systems by Third World coun-
tries has consistently resulted in an extreme disservice to its economy and the welfare of its 
citizens. Id. A generic-brand system in replacement of a trademark system has proved disas-
trous in developing countries, especially in generic labeling of medicines which lead to the 
marketing of ineffective or harmful medicines and blackmarket activity in pharmaceutical 
supplies. Id. 
137. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
138. See Note, supra note 4, at 191. The first three UNCTAD proposals frustrate the 
basic purpose of the trademark. Manufacturers will lose the incentive to produce in coun-
tries that adopt these measures. Id. 
139. Id. at 198-99. These measures will give foreign trademark owners the incentive to 
negotiate licensing agreements that maximize their gains and exploit the local population as 
they try to recover an adequate return on their investment. Id. 
140. See id. at 192. 
141. See Ball, supra note 5, at 164 n. 22; see also Note, supra note 4, at 192. 
142. See Note, supra note 4, at 194. The trademark right itself has little to do with its 
manipulation. For instance, the harmful affect of persuasive advertising could be most easily 
cured by regulating the media rather than elimination of the trademark system. Id: at 201. 
However, the best remedy would be for international trademark owners to practice a degree 
of self-control when marketing in developing countries. See UN CT AD Report, supra note 8, 
para. 30. The trademark system should survive because: (1) it serves as a channel through 
which technology is provided to developing countries and plays a vital role in advancing 
their economies; (2) it effectively distinguishes products promoting quality; and (3) it identi-
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must be mended to eliminate those actions which abuse it.143 
Developing countries have undertaken less harsh measures in 
reaction to disparities in the trademark system.144 In an attempt to 
balance the respective business positions of foreign and domestic 
companies, these countries have formulated legislation that pro-
vide preferential treatment for local industries. m Although these 
enactments may operate at the expense of foreign industries, they 
are not necessarily unfair. 146 The most common form of legislation 
are linking arrangements, generic labeling systems and regional 
treaties. 147 
A. LINKING 
Linking arrangements are commonly employed by Third 
World countries as a means of curing defects in the trademark sys-
tem.148 Linking is the use of a trademark owned by a local pro-
ducer in conjunction with a trademark licensed from its foreign 
owner.149 The purpose of linking is to permit the local trademark 
licensee to enjoy the advantages of the foreign trademark's good-
fies ·producers limiting deceptive marketing practices. See Note, supra note 4, at 191-92. 
143. See id. "Like most rights the right in a trademark can be abused; but since man-
kind has found the trademark a useful device for some centuries, it is hardly likely that it 
has been reserved to present day critics to be the first [to] discover their iniquitous (as they 
say) character. The problem today is to adapt the trademark constructively to modern con-
ditions and at the same time preserve its useful feature." Palladino, supra note 130, at 457 
(citing H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 190a, at 526 (4th ed. 
1947)). 
144. Ball, supra note 5, at 164. In developing countries where poverty, malnutrition 
and illiteracy are rampant restrictive governmental action seems justified by authorities "at-
tempting to improve the welfare of their citizens." Id. at 160. 
145. See id. at 164-65. In Argentina, for example, "the use of a trademark is voluntary, 
but it may become mandatory when required by the need of the public interest." MacDonell 
& MacDonell, Argentina, Trademark Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF 
THE WoRLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS. This law functions to serve the interest of the devel-
oping country. 
146. See Ball, supra note 5, at 165-69. The Brazilian linking law, for instance, only 
requires that a choice be made available to link the foreign and domestic trademarks. How-
ever, the Mexican linking law specifically requires linking, which will confiscate the licensors 
goodwill. The Mexican law has not been enforced. Id. at 165. 
147. See id. at 165-69. "A variety of other restrictions have been imposed, including: 
(1) compulsory licensing of trademarks; (2) establishment of 'product marks' which require 
the registration of quality standards in connection with the mark; (3) a tax based upon the 
market value of the mark; (4) the right of a developing country's licensee to bring an action 
in its own name against infringers; and (5) cancellation of registrations for 'reasons of public 
interest'." Gibson, The New Game-Trademark Handicapping, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 74-75 
(1978). 
148. See Ball, supra note 5, at 165. 
149. Id. 
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will. 150 Presumably, the consumer will come to associate the partic-
ular goods involved with the licensee's trademark. 161 If the licens-
ing agreement were to be terminated or expire the local enterprise 
could continue in business with the use of his own trademark with-
out significant harm from the loss of the foreign trademark. m 
In 1976, Mexico enacted the most austere linking law to 
date.1H The Mexican law required all foreign trademarks to be 
joined with a Mexican trademark.164 This requirement only applied 
to foreign trademarks.166 The local trademark had to be specifically 
associated with the foreign trademark.166 In 1975, Brazil issued a 
linking law which mandated that all licensing agreements involving 
trademarks provide a clause giving the licensee an option to use his 
own trademark jointly with that of the foreign trademark.167 Un-
like the Mexican law, the Brazilian law does not require mandatory 
linking, but only that the choice be made available. 168 Further-
more, the Brazilian law applies to both foreign and domestic li-
censing agreements. 169 
Linking arrangements, however, have met with stern opposi-
tion by international trademark owners,160 because linking confis-
cates the goodwill associated with their trademarks by transferring 
it to the domestic manufacturer's trademark.161 Goodwill is proba-
150. Id. 
151. Id. The domestic firm in effect captures the goodwill of the foreign trademark. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. Article 127 of the Law on Inventions and Trademarks states, "All trademarks 
of foreign origin ... which are [designed] to protect articles manufactured or produced in 
National Territory, must be used jointly with a trademark originally registered in Mexico." 
This requirement is mandatory. Law on Inventions and Trademarks, art. 127, reprinted in 2 
DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS. 
155. Ball, supra note 5, at 166. 
156. A Mexican trademark is one that is originally registered in Mexico and owned by 
a Mexican citizen. Law on Inventions and Trademarks, art. 128, reprinted in 2 DIGEST OF 
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS. 
157. Daniel, Trademark Policy in Brazil under the Second Basic Plan for Scientific 
and Technological Development, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 173, 175 (1976) . 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. See Lanahan, supra note 86, at 205; see also Willis, supra note 1, at 185. Foreign 
trademark owners posit that the consumer will be deceived by assurances of quality that 
may be absent because quality control measures enforced by the foreign owner will have 
been removed upon expiration of the licensing agreement. The public will be purchasing a 
product they believe of a certain quality when in fact it is inferior. Ball, supra note 5, at 
165-66. 
161. See Ball, supra note 5, at 166. 
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bly one of the most valuable assets a company can own.162 Foreign 
trademark owners, therefore, are reluctant to conduct business in 
countries that enact hostile legislation that attempts to appropri-
ate their trademark's goodwill.163 Indeed, some linking laws may 
prevent foreign enterprises from obtaining a reasonable return on 
their investment.164 In 1974, Argentina passed a law that required 
all foreign trademark owners to assign their trademarks to the lo-
cal licensee without compensation, or permit the local licensee to 
use his own trademark, phasing out the foreign trademark within 
five years.166 Three years after its enactment this law was abruptly 
repealed. 166 Apparently, a tremendous exodus of foreign capital 
from Argentina had ensued following the laws enforcement.167 
Ironically, by enacting linking laws to alleviate the economic 
burdens created by oppressive contracts, developing countries may 
deprive themselves of the very thing they desire-technology.168 
Nevertheless, linking continues to be attractive to developing 
countries as a plausible means to rectify the disparity in trademark 
protection afforded local producers, and as a method by which to 
acquire long term economic self-sufficiency.169 Developing coun-
tries have also experimented with other remedies to alleviate de-
fects in the trademark system.170 
B. GENERIC LABELING 
One such experiment has been the use of a generic identifica-
tion system.171 A generic term is a "common descriptive name 
which has always identified a particular product. "172 Aspirin, Cola 
162. Lanahan, supra note 86, at 213, 220; see also J. BROWN, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 8-9 (1936). 
163. Ball, supra note 5, at 166. A corporation will look unfavorably on any enactment 
that attempts to confiscate its proprietary trademark right. Id. 
164. Note, supra note 4, at 194, 198. 
165. Ball, supra note 5, at 166. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 167. The Mexican Government, since enacting its linking law in 1974, has 
granted an extension on its implementation every year, presumably because of concerns of 
similar results occurring as happened in Argentina. Id. 
169. Note, supra note 4, at 200. 
170. Id. at 193-94. 
171. Id. 
172. Kleinman, Generic Trademarks: Types of Generic Usage of Trademarks, in PAT-
ENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY, COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 141, 
at 9, 11 (Dec. 17-18, 1981). 
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and Thermos are examples of generic terms.173 To remedy per-
ceived abuses of the trademark system, developing countries have 
enacted legislation that requires products of a "similar" kind be 
labeled with a generic term in place of the various manufacturers' 
trademark identifiers.174 A generic term is devoid of any trademark 
significance; it can neither be registered nor protected by a manu-
facturer.176 The effect of requiring manufacturers to use a generic 
labeling system is to completely deprive a foreign manufacturer of 
one of his most valuable assets, the goodwill associated with his 
trademark.176 
The use of a generic system in developing countries has usu-
ally been employed in the pharmaceutical industry where health 
care concerns are paramount, and government regulatory control is 
desirable from a national perspective.177 For example, the color of 
a medicine has an important therapeutic and identification value 
to a patient.178 All that the patient desires is that the color 
medicine he associates with beneficial health effects be available 
and affordable.179 He is unaware of the product's appearance hav-
ing any trademark significance to its manufacturer.180 Rising 
health care costs attributable to the trademark, encourage develop-
ing countries to enact a generic labeling system in order to protect 
the welfare of its citizens by providing medicines at a lower cost.181 
Developing countries that have attempted to enforce generic 
legislation, however, have met with disappointing results. 182 In 
1972, Pakistan introduced a law banning the use of trademarks in 
173. See id. 
174. See Note, supra note 4, at 194. 
175. Kleinman, supra note 172, at 11. 
176. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 162, at 8-9. 
177. Ball, supra note 5, at 167. Often, developing countries fear foreign pharmaceutical 
firms use trademarks to discourage competition, limit the availability of drugs, or drive up 
prices. Id. In the pharmaceutical field, social interest policies often collide with applicable 
trademark laws and business methods. Kleinman, supra note 172, at 36. 
178. "The appearance of a drug may be highly 'significant to the user and his anxiety 
over any change in the shape of color of his regular regime may, in effect, make its appear-
ance a truly functional aspect of the medication." Kleinman, supra note 172, at 36. 
179. Id. It is only the physical appearance of the product that is of interest to the 
patient. Id. 
180. Id. The minuscule print on capsules, or even a distinctive mark embossed on a 
color-on-color pill, is rarely prominent enough to come to the attention of the patient who 
swallows the product, trademark and all. Id. 
181. See id. at 36. Rising costs of social welfare programs often lead to the implemen-
tation of a generic system because it lowers health care related costs. Id. 
182. Ball, supra note 5, at 167. 
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the pharmaceutical industry.183 The aftermath of this experiment 
was a catastrophe.18" The marketplace became flooded with 
medicines bearing generic names, many of which had no therapeu-
tic value,18~ and prices remained stable or increased.186 In 1971, Sri 
Lanka enacted a similar law which resulted in like consequences.187 
The abolition of trademarks in the pharmaceutical industries 
of Pakistan and Sri Lanka ended a viable method of distinguishing 
between products, and of identifying the quality associated with 
certain goods.188 Moreover, by replacing the trademark identifica-
tion system with a generic labeling system, a practical means was 
eliminated for locating a product's origin so that its manufacturer 
could be held accountable for any defects in its products. 189 These 
results demonstrate that the trademark is useful and should not be 
abandoned.190 Yet, despite the apparent benefits related to the use 
of a trademark identification system and the severe economic 
destabilization resulting from the implementation of a generic la-
beling system, developing countries continue to devise laws that 
eliminate the use of trademarks in particular industries in an effort 
to carry out justified governmental concerns that the public not be 
exploited.191 Not all abuses of the trademark system, however, 
have necessitated such a drastic measure as the introduction of an 
alternative identification system. 192 
C. REGIONAL TREATIES 
Another method developing countries have employed to allevi-
ate the effects of inequitable licensing agreements and to lower the 
costs connected with administering the trademark system, has 
been to enter into limited regional trademark agreements.193 The 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. Apparently, a large black market developed for drugs that bore a brand name 
label. Id. 
187. Note, supra note 4, at 194; see also Ball, supra note 5, at 167. 
188. See Ball, supra note 5, at 167, 172. The generic labeling system resulted in harm 
to the consumer by creating high priced and ineffective drugs. Id. The trademark system 
protects the consumer. Shanahan, supra note 26, at 234. See generally Ball, supra note 5, at 
167, 172. 
189. See Ball, supra note 5, at 167, 172. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 167. 
192. Note, supra note 4, at 194. 
193. Ball, supra note 5, at 169 nn. 40-41. These agreements include the Afro-Malagray 
Union that was established in 1963. Its purpose is to reduce administration costs by the 
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most significant and inhibitive of these agreements is the Andean 
Pact.1"' 
The Andean Pact enunciates several restrictions on the forma-
tion of licensing agreements between international trademark own-
ers and firms located in member States.196 The agreement provides 
for governmental approval of all licensing contracts and requires 
that approval be based on a variety of factors. 196 The agreement 
prohibits all licensing contracts that place any limitation upon the 
licensee's right to export, that fix the price of sale or resale of the 
product bearing the trademark, or that require the payment of 
royalties from the local subsidiary to its foreign parent company.197 
These requirements may alarm many foreign trademark own-
ers, because their enforcement may result in insufficient renumera-
tion of the capital originally invested by foreign manufacturers in 
countries that are members of this Pact.198 As with linking laws, 
foreign businesses will be induced to select other regions in which 
to invest their knowledge, skill and capital that are more favorable 
to their business interests.199 
The efforts of Third World countries to ameliorate abuses in 
the trademark system by the use of linking arrangements, generic 
labeling and regional treaties has only been partially successful. 200 
formation of a central trademark office. Today the Union is composed of Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Dahaney, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, 
Sengal, Togo and Upper Volta. In 1975, the Central American Convention was formed. Its 
objective is to unify the requirements of trademark registration among member nations. 
Currently, the Convention is comprised of Costa Rica, Gautemala and Nicaragua. Id. 
194. Willis, supra note 1, at 185. The Andean Pact was formed as a result of the Carta-
gena Agreement of 1969. Member countries include: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Ven-
ezuela, Brazil, India and North Korea. Note, supra note 4, at 194. The treaty's purpose is 
the economic integration of member nations and a mutually beneficial system for imple-
menting trademark registration. Taylor & Bentata, Trademark User Requirements in Latin 
America, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 109 (1984). 
195. Ladas, Latin American Economic Integration & Industrial Property, 62 TRADE-
MARK REP. 1 (1972); see also Willis, supra note 1, at 185. 
196. See Ball, supra note 5, at 169 (citing the Commission of the Agreement of Carta-
gena, Dec. No. 24, art. 18, reprinted in 3 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (codi-
fied as the Andean Pact)). The government will evaluate the contract's "probable useful-
ness, the price of the goods which will incorporate the technology, or other specific forms of 
evaluation of the effects of the imported technology." Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Note, supra note 4, at 198. 
199. Willis, supra note 1, at 185. "Today business executives of most U.S. companies 
have little or no incentive to consider new licenses of trademarks" in countries that are 
members of the Andean Pact. Id. 
200. Ball, supra note 5, at 172. Many foreign trademarks are jeopardized by linking 
arrangements, generic labeling and regional treaties, but no real benefit accrues to the local 
economy or the public. Id. 
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Their actions, however, have focused world attention on the re-
sentment developing countries feel toward the reliance domestic 
consumers have on foreign trademarks and the exploitation of do-
mestic industries. 201 American companies operating in developing 
countries have encountered this resentment and have been sub-
jected to the legislative requirements many Third World countries 
have enacted to end these abuses. 202 
V. A UNITED STATES RESPONSE 
In response, the U.S. Government proposed several bills to im-
prove intellectual property protection and market access for Amer-
ican companies operating abroad. 203 The most relevant of these 
proposals is the Anti-Piracy and Market Access Act.20• Its purpose 
is essentially threefold: (1) to develop an overall strategy to open 
international markets to U.S. companies that rely on intellectual 
property protection; (2) to use all appropriate multilateral institu-
tions to improve the subst~ntive norms and standards for intellec-
tual property protection; and (3) to eliminate a broad variety of 
unfair and discriminatory trade practices now imposed on U.S. 
companies that rely on intellectual property protection. 206 
This act, though based on findings that have some merit, 206 
201. Id. 
202. Willis, supra note 1, at 184. 
203. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at 7, col. 1; see also supra note 9. The aim of these 
proposals are to cure deficiencies in intellectual property protections (chiefly patent in-
fringement), and prevent the enforcement of barriers, acts, policies, and practices by major 
U.S. trading partners in the Third World. Id. However, they apply to trademark restrictions 
imposed by developing countries as well. This paper focuses only on the trademark protec-
tion embodied in the acts. This paper examines S.335 most closely. S. 2435, proposed in 
1986, was substantially the same in form and function, and H.R.4800 created a negotiating 
process to improve the protection of U.S. companies' intellectual property rights whereby 
(1) the U.S. Trade Representative is required to identify priority foreign countries that deny 
fair and equitable market access to such products, and (2) the President shall direct the 
U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate for improved market access to such countries. If the 
negotiations are not successful within two years, the President shall take such action as he 
deems appropriate. See H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This process is similar to 
that found in S. 2435. 
204. Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The act 
states that protecting the interests of U.S. firms that rely on intellectual property protec-
tions "are major elements of United States foreign economic policy that have significant 
commercial importance." Id. at 3. 
205. Id. at 3-4. 
206. See id. at 2. This act is based on findings that inadequate intellectual property 
protections lead to the loss of export markets, that existing international agreements do not 
sufficiently protect U.S. interests, and, that foreign barriers including restrictions and condi-
tions placed on investment or licensing, and various other regulations on business operations 
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may exacerbate an international crisis by fueling the animosity de-
veloping countries feel toward American companies operating 
within their borders.207 A disagreeable reaction is especially likely 
because restrictive barriers enacted by developing countries are 
often based upon legitimate fears and valid concerns over the wel-
fare of their citizens, as well as their nations' troubled 
economies. 208 
The Anti-Piracy and Market Access Act consists of four sepa-
rate actions to increase international trademark protection and 
open foreign markets to American firms that rely on trademark 
protection.209 The first action requires the U.S. Trade representa-
tive to analyze trademark barriers that are present in foreign coun-
tries and the extent to which their markets are inaccessible to 
American firms. 210 This analysis is commenced when the Trade 
Representative composes a list of all countries that deny U.S. firms 
adequate and effective trademark protection.211 From this list, for-
eign countries are assigned priorities. 212 A foreign country is as-
signed priority status if it constructs barriers that are particularly 
onerous in nature or that prevent fair and equitable access to a 
market of significant size. 213 These conditions appear to give the 
seriously impede the ability of U.S. companies that rely on intellectual property protection 
to operate overseas. Id. The decline of the trademark system in developing countries is not 
solely the result of abuses by international trademark owners. Willis, supra note 1, at 184. 
The inadequate protection provided American companies is not justified from an economic 
or social stand point in all cases. Id. "The erosion of the protection of international trade-
marks to the point of destruction or elimination in a country is at best only a diversionary 
vendetta, delaying the taking of effective measures to deal with real causes which are lack of 
infrastructure to support technological and economic development, lack of stable free-mar-
ket incentives, lack' of education, lack of political stability, and downright lethargy." Id. 
These claims may be true in some cases, but their resolution may not lie in pursuing a 
policy like that presently advocated by the U.S. Government. However, some drastic situa-
tions may call for the implementation of drastic measures. One such measure would be for 
an international trademark owner to boycott contractual arrangements with businesses lo-
cated in developing countries that exploit the international trademark owner. See infra 
notes 280-81 and accompanying text. 
207. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 5, col. 2. International corporations affiliated 
with American companies are worried about the repercussions they will face in consequence 
of a U.S. bill that advocates retaliation. Id. 
208. Legislative actions undertaken by developing countries are often the result of past 
experience. See supra notes 41-52. These countries enact such laws to resolve defects in the 
trademark system, and remedy problems of unequal bargaining positions that sap Third 
World industries of their resources and chances for economic development. Id. 
209. See Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 4-10 (1987). 
210. Id. at 4-5, 10-12. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. Three additional factors are taken into account by the Trade Representative 
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act's enforcement a degree of flexibility and make its impact on 
developing countries less threatening, either because these coun-
tries often have small markets or their enactments could be con-
strued as less onerous. 214 However, a favorable characterization is 
unlikely.215 
The second action requires the President of the United States 
to enter into negotiations with foreign countries given priority sta-
tus, in order to establish adequate and effective intellectual prop-
erty protection for U.S. firms conducting business in these coun-
tries. 216 The objective of this negotiation process is to improve 
American business interests abroad.217 This section of the act im-
plements this objective by permitting the President to enter into 
agreements that reduce or eliminate foreign trademark barriers. 218 
These barriers, however, are often in place to prevent the exploita-
tion of Third World countries by industrialized nations. 219 Thus, 
the objectives of this negotiation process provide little incentive 
for the attainment of a negotiated agreement that is mutually 
in determining whether a foreign country market is open to U.S. businesses that rely on 
trademark protections. They include: (1) whether any restrictions or conditions have been 
placed on investment, or on the establishment of U.S. companies within the foreign coun-
tries; (2) whether any licensing or certification restrictions exist limiting U.S. firms from 
"function[ing] freely in the markets of those countries;" and (3) whether U.S. companies 
"suffer from discriminatory of monopolistic practices" within these countries. Id. at 12. In 
general, these factors apply to copyright and patent problems. However, they may be appli-
cable to trademark problems. 
These factors clearly forbid many enactments proposed by developing countries. Mex-
ico's linking requirement would be prohibited by these criteria because they apply only to 
foreign firms, and are therefore discriminatory. See supra notes 127-35. 
214. Market size is not defined by the act. See Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 
335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). In 1972, U.S. firms accounted for more than two-thirds of 
all trademarks registered in developing countries. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 114. The con-
centration of foreign ownership of trademarks in a developing country could be defined as 
sizable. 
215. Any trademark barrier enforced by a developing country is potentially burden-
some or oppressive to certain U.S. firms. See Note, supra note 4, at 198. Onerous is not 
defined by the act, but since the act's objective is to eliminate any practices or policies that 
hinders certain U.S. business interests abroad, this factor hardly serves developing countries 
whose actions are justified. See The Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, 100th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1987). 
216. See The Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
The act gives the President authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries to 
harmonize, reduce, eliminate or prohibit restrictions, fees, or other acts that distort trade. 
Id. These sections of the act allows the President some leeway in negotiating trademark 
protections for U.S. firms. 
217. Id. at 9. For instance, the act permits the President to include any U.S. concession 
which might achieve U.S. objectives. Id. at 10. 
218. Id. at 14. 
219. See T. McCARTHY, supra note 30, at 57, 95; Note, supra note 4, at 182-83. 
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beneficial. 220 
Next, if the President is unable to enter into a negotiated 
agreement, the act requires that "remedies" be applied to priority 
countries as a means of insuring that the act's objectives are 
reached. 221 The "remedies" include termination of any trade agree-
ment entered into with a priority state, and an increase in any 
duty on any article imported to the United States from that for-
eign country.222 These remedies are, in fact, penalties that may se-
verely hamper developing countries that rely on the United States 
as a trading partner, either by limiting their ability to compete in 
the international market or by destabilizing their fragile econo-
mies. 228 Finally, the fourth action merely provides for "the presen-
tation of views by interested parties. "224 It does not insure repre-
sentation of a party's opinion in the resulting agreement. 2H 
These four actions required by the act demonstrate that pro-
tecting U.S. business interests while impairing the economic inter-
ests of developing countries is the sole concern of this legislation. 226 
The U.S. Gover:nµient has decreed that any country which does 
not "provide adequate and effective means under its laws," al-
lowing U.S. firms to secure, exercise and enforce 'exclusive' rights 
of their trademarks may be subject to severe trade and monetary 
220. See Proposed Foreign Trade Legislation, supra note 18, at 215. 
221. See Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10 (1987). 
The remedies include the following actions to fully achieve the objectives of this act: 
(1) terminate, withdraw, or suspend any portion of any trade agreement entered 
into with such foreign country or instrumentality. 
(2) proclaim an increase in, or the imposition of, any duty on any article imported 
from such foreign country. 
(3) proclaim a tariff-rate quota on any article imported from such foreign country. 
(4) proclaim the modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the 
importation of any article from such foreign country. 
(5) suspend, in whole or in part, benefits accorded articles from such foreign 
countries. 
(6) take any other action pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974. 
Id. The remedies can be used to achieve an increase in market access or an improvement in 
trademark protection for U. S. firms operating abroad. Id. 
222. See id. 
223. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at 7, col. 1. Often these countries are attempting to 
provide the best trademark protection for all businesses operating within their borders. 
These countries may lack the capital or skill needed to administer sufficient protections. 
The U.S. Government's ability to apply harsh penalties clearly puts American businesses in 
an unfair and superior bargaining position. See id. 
224. See The Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 16 
(1987). 
225. Id. 
226. See supra notes 209-25 and accompanying text. 
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sanctions.227 Despite a small degree of flexibility in its implementa-
tion, the act diminishes the possibility of attaining a mutually ac-
ceptable negotiated agreement.228 Developing countries are shack-
led by their lack of economic strength and the manner in which 
this act is to be executed. 229 These countries will be coerced into 
unilateral trademark agreements by the threat of sanctions if the 
objectives of the act are not voluntarily met.280 Unfortunately, this 
act merely operates in the guise of a negotiating agreement. 281 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
Clearly, a conflict exists between developing countries and in-
dustrialized nations over the protection to be given trademarks. 282 
In an effort to combat the enactment of protective legislation by 
Third World countries, a pattern has emerged which neither re-
solves nor advances the mutual interests of both parties to the 
conflict. 288 
As Third World countries progress economically, they seek in-
dustrial self-reliance.284 The foreign trademark that originally 
served as a conduit for the importation of much-needed technology 
becomes a source of resentment as foreign trademark owners retain 
"control" of the domestic market.285 Furthermore, international 
trademark agreements are inadequate to protect the interests of 
developing countries, and often contribute to the creation of barri-
ers that prevent these countries from securing their future devel-
opment. 286 As a consequence, developing countries have introduced 
legislation designed to supplement existing protections and which 
serve national interests. 287 
227. See The Anti-Piracy & Market Access Act, S. 335, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10, 16 
(1987). The act's philosophy is that unfair trade practices and barriers must be eliminated, 
and if they are not, sanctions should be implemented automatically. N.Y. Times, June 21, 
1987, at 5, col. 2. Retaliation, reciprocation and toughness are the cornerstone of this act. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Ball, supra note 5, at 160. 
233. Id. at 172. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. The domestic consumer remains attracted to a product bearing the foreign 
trademark. The domestic producer has previously established goodwill among the local pop-
ulation that ultimately benefits the trademark's owner. See supra notes 29-39 and accompa-
nying text. 
236. See supra notes 94-128. 
237. O'Brien, supra note 24, at 100; see also supra notes 144-47 and accompanying 
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The enforcement of this legislation has in most instances 
caused chaos in the marketplace,288 retaliation by foreign manufac-
turers, 289 or the enactment of trade protectionist measures by in-
dustrialized nations.240 In turn, these events have usually resulted 
in developing countries revoking their restrictive trademark legis-
lation. 241 Thus, developing countries return to their original and 
unsatisfactory state of market inequality.242 This pattern will con-
tinue to repeat itself, unless alternative solutions are sought or 
modifications met that resolve the abuses of the trademark 
system.248 
The legislation proposed by the U.S. Government does not at-
tempt to cure the manipulation of the trademark system in devel-
oping countries. 244• The legislation will continue the cycle of reac-
tive and retaliatory actions which results in the trademark's 
traditional function being rendered useless. 24G This occurs because 
the acts are driven by a policy which parallels the very reasons for 
the plight of the trademark system in developing countries.246 The 
proposals advocate a policy of self-interest and protectionism.247 As 
developing countries have sought to protect the welfare of their 
citizens, the United States has reacted by promoting a policy 
which insures that American business interests abroad are pro-
text. 
238. Note, supra note 4, at 180. 
239. See supra notes 165-67. 
240. See H.R. 4585, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). This bill, recently enacted into law, is 
designed to strengthen intellectual property protections for American firms overseas by 
preventing patent counterfeiting. It is protectionist in nature. See id. 
241. See supra note 168. 
242. Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
243. Id. 
244. See supra notes 227-31. 
245. See supra notes 231-37. Canadian Ambassador Allan E. Gotlieb described the re-
sult of enacting the proposed legislation as unleashing an "unpredictable and uncontrollable 
chain of events." N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 5, col. 2. 
246. See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text. The international trademark cri-
sis exists because foreign trademark owners abuse Third World economies and societies, and 
in response, developing countries implement legislation to protect their trademark related 
economic interests. Industrialized nations react by imposing sanctions. Id. These actions are 
motivated be self-interest, and not fair bargaining. Id. Likewise, the U.S. reaction is protec-
tionistic and inequitable. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 5, col. 2. "Unfair trade practices 
generally turn out to be what the other fellow does, not what one does oneself." Id. (Sir Roy 
Denman, head of the Washington delegation of the Commission of the European Commu-
nity, speaking on the trade bills recently proposed in the U.S. Congress). 
247. Proposed Foreign Trade Legislation, supra note 18, at 215. The United States 
must "not isolate [itself] and its economy under a suffocating cover of protectionism. Id. 
(U.S. representative Jack F. Kemp on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives during 
consideration of H.R.4800.) 
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tected, but at the social and economic expense of developing 
countries. 248 
The legislation proposed by the United States may cause de-
veloping countries to revoke local trademark restrictions;249 restric-
tions which were necessitated in part because of the exploitation of 
their commercial resources by American companies. 26° Coercing 
developing countries into revoking such laws would place these 
countries in perilous economic positions. 261 It is unlikely that de-
veloping countries will endure economic coercion.2H Rather than 
submit to unfavorable terms in a one-sided trademark agreement, 
it is more likely that developing countries will retaliate by enacting 
legislation that is equally protective, and suffer the invocation of 
trade penalties by the U.S. Government. 263 
Whether developing countries submit or retaliate, these coun-
tries will not view the trademark system as a means by which con-
sumers and manufacturers are protected,264 but as a tool that in-
dustrialized nations use to strengthen their own economies. 266 Such 
a belief will only escalate the resentment Third World countries 
feel toward foreign trademark owners and shatter the confidence 
these countries have in the value of the trademark system.256 Con-
sequently, if industrialized nations and developing countries imple-
ment policies independent of each other, designed to protect their 
own economic interests that facilitate the continued pattern of re-
taliatory actions by both sides, these policies will cause the decline 
of the trademark's usefulness in Third World countries. 267 
Therefore, a policy that advocates trademark protectionism 
will not cure the woes of American firms operating abroad. 268 Such 
a policy will only have an adverse impact on the trademark sys-
tem. 269 Indeed, current administrative policy will not resolve the 
international trademark crisis, but enlarge it.260 The crisis will be 
248. Id.; see also supra notes 215-31 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 229-31. 
250. See supra notes 41-52, 208 and accompanying text. 
251. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1986, at 7, col. 1. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. These acts will "invite, encourage, and almost demand counter-retaliation by 
other nations." Id. 
254. Id. 
255. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
256. Id. 
257. See id.; see also Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
258. See N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 5, col. 2. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
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enlarged when developing countries respond to the threat of sanc-
tions by enacting legislation which creates new barriers that pre-
vent American companies fair and equitable access to their mar-
kets. 261 In order to protect the intellectual property interests of 
American firms overseas, the U.S. Government will have to pursue 
a policy which does not escalate the international trademark cri-
sis. 26~ A policy of compromise, understanding, and education will 
secure American business interests abroad, and the U.S. Govern-
ment is in an ideal position to promote this policy.268 
VII. ALTERNATIVES 
There are several measures that the U.S. government could 
promote to alleviate the present trademark crisis. They include a 
program of awareness, 264 the use of common sense in bargaining 
future licensing agreements with manufacturers from Third World 
countries, 261 and the acceptance of limited legislative action by de-
veloping countries that favor domestic enterprises. 266 These three 
measures could be applied to stabilize the international trademark 
crisis.267 
261. See Proposed Foreign Trade Legislation, supra note 18, at 201. 
262. See id. at 215. "The United States must break barriers [through] the spread of 
freedom and democratic capitalism" and not protectionist trademark legislation that would 
operate at the expense of Third World countries and cause economic retaliation against 
American firms operating abroad. Id. 
263. Id. "[T]alk must be translated into trade liberalization, privatization, and the 
freeing up of markets." Id. Fair negotiation processes will alleviate the inadequate trade-
mark protection afforded American firms in developing countries. See Willis, supra note l, 
at 186. "A more equitable, moderate and cooperative approach towards balancing the objec-
tives of [developing] countries and the proprietary rights of the international owners of 
trademarks" will settle the conflict. Id. 
264. A · program of educating developing countries to be aware of the benefits they re-
ceive from the trademark system is essential to its continued existence. Gibson, supra note 
148, at 82. 
265. Id. The international trademark owner can deal with the domestic industry and 
consumer more fairly to relieve local governments apprehension in the use of trademarks, 
without "destroy[ing] our free-market system." Id. at 75. Developing countries fear that 
international trademark owners will misuse their trademarks to retain market control and 
bleed their countries dry of valuable resources. See supra notes 55-62, 70-77 and accompa-
nying text. 
266. Reasonable measures implemented by developing countries would safeguard their 
local industries and future development. Ball, supra note 5, at 173. International trademark 
owners, however, fear that such actions may strip them of their proprietary rights, and 
therefore, they will resist such measures. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text. As 
a result, restrictive legislation enacted by developing countries must be limited in scope and 
acceptable to the international trademark community. 
267. Gibson, supra note 148, at 83. 
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The first measure could be achieved by a program of educa-
tion and training. Hs Developing countries will have to be convinced 
that the trademark system has positive social and economic value 
if used properly.He A program of education and training would al-
low a developing country to comprehend the value of the trade-
mark and use it in the most expedient manner/no However, ade-
quate means do not exist for making developing countries aware of 
the value of the trademark.211 UNCTAD, while potentially an or-
ganization that has the capability to initiate a global program of 
education and training, has "consistently disclaimed the virtues of 
the trademark. "272 
Private industry may attempt to persuade Third World gov-
ernments as best they can, but better results could be achieved by 
governmental programs undertaken by industrialized nations. 278 
The U.S. government recently proposed the Technology Transfer 
& Intellectual Property Protection Act. 274 This act calls for the cre-
ation of programs to assist foreign countries in developing and im-
plementing adequate intellectual property laws, and the establish-
ment of an institution to train officials of developing nations "in 
both the management and technical skills" needed to enact and 
enforce trademark laws. 27& The purpose of this act and its imple-
mentation methods, however, are similar to those found in the 
Anti-Piracy and Market Access Act, and therefore its usefulness in 
ameliorating the present conflict is doubtful.276 Nonetheless, its 
268. Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
269. Id. 
270. Shanahan, supra note 26, at 235. "One generally finds a lack of respect for indus-
trial property rights in Third World countries." Id. Developing countries will have to be 
instructed and convinced as to the trademark's value. Ball, supra note 5, at 172. 
271. Ball, supra note 5, at 173. 
272. Id. 
273. See id. Industrialized nations have the capital and administrative resources to 
pursue such goals. However, to date no government has initiated an adequate program. Id. 
274. S. 2663, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The focus of the act is on technology transfer, 
and applies to technological firms that rely on trademark protection. Id. 
275. Id. at 10-12. 
276. Id. at 2-5. The act's purpose is to promote U.S. business interests abroad and 
eliminate restrictive barriers. An unacceptable barrier would include a policy that requires 
approval by the foreign government as a condition to conducting business within the coun-
try. Id. The Andean Pact would therefore be prohibited by this act since it requires govern-
ment approval of a licensing agreement. See supra notes 194-95. 
The act's implementation involves methods such as negotiation and vigorous enforce-
ment of U.S. trade laws to attain increased intellectual property protection for American 
firms. The likely consequence of implementing this act is increased hostility among Third 
World countries toward the United States. Id. 
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emphasis on education and training will serve as a valuable foun-
dation for future enactments designed to remedy the trademark 
crisis through programs of awareness. 277 
The second measure involves a degree of self-control by the 
private sector. 27s American companies will need to employ common 
sense when dealing with Third World governments or industries, 
and not undertake actions offensive to these entities that might 
initiate retaliatory trademark restrictions.279 Negotiating fair 
agreements may eliminate many of the causes these countries orig-
inally had for enforcing restrictive trademark legislation, and se-
cure American business interests abroad. 2s0 
The third measure would allow developing countries to enact 
legislation to cure limited inequalities that continue to persist in 
the trademark system, without the threat of reprisals.2s1 This legis-
lation could require licensing agreements to: 
(1) contain a clause establishing the length of time necessary for a 
licensor to recover his investment;282 
(2) contain a provision for advance notification of termination of 
the licensing agreement in order to allow the licensee to phase out 
the foreign trademark and introduce one of his own;288 
( 3) eliminate export restrictions;284 and, 
( 4) place a cap for a specified amount over which licensing fees 
277. See Ball, supra note 5, at 173; see also UNCTAD Report, supra note 8, para. 75. 
278. Note, supra note 4, at 201. 
279. See Ball, supra note 5, at 165, 173. Common sense actions by foreign trademark 
owners include: (1) selecting products for sale in the local market that meet the needs of the 
country; (2) allocating advertising responsibility to the local licensee and limiting the use of 
persuasive advertising; (3) bargaining the terms of a licensing agreement fairly. Its terms 
should be clear and mutually beneficial; (4) using domestic resources and labor where possi-
ble and employing them in a non-exploitive manner; (5) allowing the local licensee to benefit 
from the goodwill of the foreign trademark; and, (6) if the developing state continues to 
unfairly restrict the owners trademark, withdraw! from conducting business in that develop-
ing nation. Note, supra note 4, at 200-02; see also Willis, supra note 1, at 184. 
Foreign companies should not allow the "cure" to become a vendetta by developing 
countries involving the wholesale confiscation or destruction of their trademarks. The "con-
cepts of equity, moderation, and cooperation" should govern their contractual relationships. 
Id. "The behavior of multinational corporations [is] not always in line with government 
policies in host countries and that action [is] required to achieve harmony." UNCTAD Re-
port, supra note 8, para. 31. 
280. Willis, supra note l, at 187. Once a foreign trademark owner has established a 
reputation for negotiating in good faith, and they meet developing countries part way, not 
only will the trademark conflict be reduced, but developing countries will listen when for-
eign trademark owners dig in and take a firm position on particular points. Id. 
281. Ball, supra note 5, at 164. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Note, supra note 4, at 202. 
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may not exceed in order to avoid the remittance of excessive 
fees. 2st 
By allowing developing countries to legislate in a reasonable man-
ner, shared confidence and mutual respect may be established 
thereby providing a better foundation upon which to conduct 
business. 286 
The legislation proposed by the U.S. government does not pro-
mote education, fair bargaining, and the acceptance of limited 
modification in the trademark system, in a manner that satisfacto-
rily addresses the decline of the trademark system in developing 
countries. 287 The alternatives recommended, however, will increase 
a developing country's understanding of the trademark's useful-
ness and value,288 and allow compromise in the common practices 
of international trademark law.289 These alternative solutions will 
slow the deterioration of the trademark system and improve intel-
lectual property protection for American companies in Third 
World countries by encouraging the pursuit of mutually beneficial 
objectives. 290 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The international trademark crisis is not a product of the 
trademark's inappropriateness as a device that functions to protect 
the interests of consumers and manufacturers, but of different so-
cial and economic objectives existing in industrialized nations and 
developing countries. 291 The pursuit of these objectives diminishes 
the integrity of the trademark system and facilitates its decline in 
Third World countries. 292 As a result, the U.S. Government will 
not resolve the inadequate trademark protection that is provided 
to American companies abroad by implementing a policy that is 
285. Id. at 200; see also UNCTAD Report, supra note 8, para. 18. 
286. See Vargas, supra note 51, at 204. 
287. See supra notes 209-31 and accompanying text. 
288. See supra notes 269-78 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text. 
290. See Ball, supra note 5, at 173, 174; see also Note, supra note 4, at 200-02. 
291. Ball, supra note 5, at 174. 
292. Id. "It is inevitable that there will be some conflict between the legitimate inter-
ests of the Third World and those of multinational concerns, but given their common pur-
pose, these differences should not be regarded as irreconcilable." Both sides will have to 
acknowledge their differences or face a continuing deterioration in the trademark system in 
developing countries. Id. Such a course would not be beneficial to American business inter-
est abroad. 
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protectionist in nature.298 This type of policy will have a detrimen-
tal impact on Third World countries and exacerbate the deteriora-
tion of the trademark system, as these countries react adversely to 
this policy.294 
What may resolve the current international trademark crisis is 
for the United States to lead the world in formulating better solu-
tions that promote common objectives,296 rather than reacting im-
providently to momentary differences in perspective and the tran-
sient desires of certain American companies. A policy which 
promotes compromise and understanding will settle the differ-
ences, and resolve the conflict. In the future, the United States 
may effectuate a more favorable business climate by encouraging 
better relations with foreign countries instead of encouraging busi-
ness at the expense of better relations. 
Raymer McQuiston 
293. See supra notes 248-62 and accompanying text. 
294. Id. 
295. Ball, supra note 5, at 174. The United States should not abandon its free-market 
principles. Gibson, supra note 148, at 75. The alternatives recommended do not promote 
such a notion, but rather seek to achieve some equitable means of ending the present trade-
mark crisis without furthering the deterioration of the trademark system. 
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